2018年9月25日 星期二

week 3. parallel universes

相較於哲學上對多重實在的形上學探討,物理學更聚焦在「真實世界」的多重性詮釋,即所謂的「平 行宇宙」(parallel universes)。Max Tegmark (2003)發表在美國科學人雜誌上的論文,提出平行宇宙的四 個層次的分類學:

Level 1:
形成我們所在的宇宙的組合方式必定發生過不只一 次,與我們自身相似的對應體(counterparts)必然存在於多重宇宙的某處。在某個與我們宇宙相近的複 本中,我們的對應體正經歷著另一個不一樣的命運。Tegmark 描述第一層次的平行宇宙有相同的物理 定律,但可能在初始值的設定上不同,例如,與我們最接近的複本中的我們的幽靈,已經經歷了 2020 年。



also see:
https://twinstrangers.net/

Level 2:
第二層的另類空間來自於宇宙大爆炸以來,空間的不規則的伸展,所形成的多重世界。根據 Tegmark 的說法,有些區域已經停止伸展並且形成泡泡,而當此泡泡爆炸,便形成新的第一層次多重宇宙。因 此,第二層次的宇宙來自於空間中的遞迴式嵌入(recursive embedding),而 Brian Greene 認為此種現象 是所謂的黑洞效應。...Tegmark 則 認爲 level 2 宇宙與 level 1 有相同的物理定律,但只是在常數和等式中代入不同的數字。

Level 4 第四層次的宇宙基來自於一個思想實驗(thought experiment):此類型宇宙的物理定律沒有絕對的必然 和我們所處的宇宙完全一樣。Tegmark 提問,一個遵循古典物理卻沒有量子效應的宇宙會如何? 時間 是離散(discrete)而非連續的宇宙會如何?Tegmark 建議 level 4 宇宙是所有數學可以描述的所有可能 世界,唯一的限制就是 level 4 宇宙不可違反數學邏輯。

Level 3 這個類型的平行宇宙就是發生在次原子層次最聲名狼藉的奇怪現象,使得物理學家做出平行宇宙的假 設。不同於 level 2 和 level 4(可能與目前的物理定律不同),level 3 對於量子現象之多重世界詮釋,並 未違反任何物理定律。次原子粒子的行為,例如電子,無法以絕對的確定性預測,僅可以機率描述, 但無法預測此機率的哪一部分被真實化(actualized),此機率以數學描述即是所謂粒子的波形函數(wave function of the particle),著名的薛丁格等式(Schrödinger equation)。量子力學的隨機函數,暗示了多重 可能世界:一個電子所有可能的位置和軌跡,只有一個會被實現,其他僅以可能的機率被理解。


哥本哈根詮釋
"哥本哈根詮釋(Copenhagen interpretation)是量子力學的一種詮釋。根據哥本哈根詮釋,在量子力學裏,量子系統的量子態,可以用波函數來描述,這是量子力學的一個關鍵特色,波函數是個數學函數,專門用來計算粒子在某位置或處於某種運動狀態的機率,測量的動作造成了波函數塌縮,原本的量子態機率地塌縮成一個測量所允許的量子態。”  ~wiki


雙縫實驗





量子延遲:


惠勒延遲實驗:




https://www.bilibili.com/video/av25010229/

延遲實驗中量子改變過去:



https://www.bilibili.com/video/av11761018/

量子糾纏




 塌縮 (collapse)
1. 如果應用在人的回憶,是否有相同的現象?
2. 所謂歷史,是否有實在論 (realism),量子觀的歷史如何看待塌縮?
3. 測量是甚麼,意圖在測量中扮演的腳色如何?
4. "意圖"在回顧已發生事件中的腳色如何?
5. 逆向因果律的可能性。



參考文獻:
1. Max Tegmark. 2003. Parallel universes. Scientific American. May, 40-51.

2018年9月18日 星期二

week 2. possible world theory

1. The universe of possible worlds is constantly expanding and diversifying
thanks to the incessant world-constructing activity of human minds and
hands. Literary fiction is probably the most active experimental

laboratory of the world-constructing enterprise. p. 69, SE


2. 
As Lubomír Doležel writes in Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds,

“Our actual world is surrounded by an infinity of other possible worlds.” p. 70, SE

3. Make-believe theory, make-believe play

4. 
Although rarely discussed in design beyond the construction of
brand worlds and corporate future technology videos, there is a rich
body of theoretical work in other fields dealing with the idea of fictional
worlds. Probably the most abstract discussion is in philosophy where
differences between the many shades of real, fictional, possible, actual,
unreal, and imaginary are teased out. In social and political science the
focus is on modeling reality; in literary theory it is on the semantics of
the real and nonreal; in fine art, make-believe theory and fiction; in
game design, literal world creation; and even in science there are many
rich strands of discourse around fictionalism, useful fictions, model
organisms, and multiverses. For us, the key distinction is between
actual and fictional. Actual is part of the world we occupy whereas
fictional is not. p. 70, SE

5.
Speculating is based on imagination, the ability to literally (如實地) imagine

other worlds and alternatives.

6.
Possible worlds is a philosophical concept developed in the
latter twentieth century by the analytical school, including
philosophers Saul Kripke and David Lewis [34, 48] and
was later adopted by literary theorists [cf. 38, 22, 45].
Philosophically, possible worlds is an approach to the
problem of counterfactual statements in modal logic. For
example, Kripke asks what is the truth condition of the
statement that Sherlock Holmes “does not exist, but in other
states of affairs he would have existed” [31]; or this
counterfactual statement by Ryan [48], “if a couple hundred
more Florida voters had voted for Gore in 2000, the Iraq
war would not have happened.” In modal logic, the
question is how is each of these counterfactual statements
interpreted to be true or false. The philosopher David Lewis
who bridged analytical philosophy to literary theory [32]
offered the position that propositions like counterfactual
statements can be seen to be either true or false dependent
on in which worlds the statement is true and which worlds

the statement is false [34]. p. 100, MS



7.
A counterfactual is a virtual or
tangible artifact or system in design and HCI rather than
statement or text. Hence we refer to it as a counterfactual
artifact. The notion of an actual counterfactual is a
departure from Lewis’ criterion that possible worlds have
no spatial or temporal connections to the actual world—
they are remote. Yet, here we view this departure more
advantageously than negatively. p. 101, MS

8. There is a productive and creative space at the boundary

between the actual and possible worlds, or the real and the
fictional. There are many examples from fiction in literary
texts, theatre or film where authors intentionally blur the
distinction between actual and possible worlds for its
creative possibilities. p. 101, MS

9. 
In these cases, interactivity is the
counterfactual action that crosses the divide: fictional
characters are not supposed to interact with actual people or
in the actual world. In material speculation, it is making the
counterfactual into an actual artifact that crosses the divide
between the actual and possible worlds since, as we
discussed earlier (see Possible worlds theory),
counterfactuals are not supposed to exist in the same time
or place as the actual world. p. 101, MS

10.
In material speculation we can see the counterfactual
artifact as embodied propositions similar to propositions in
counterfactual statements in analytical philosophy. It is
helpful to think of the counterfactual artifacts as being
if…then statements as we discussed earlier (see Possible
worlds theory). In this sense, the counterfactual artifacts
trigger possible world reasoning that extends beyond them.
In other words, the possible world or fictional account is
not embodied fully in the counterfactual artifact rather it is
generated by interactors in the encounter or experience of
the counterfactual artifact. It is not a limitation that the
counterfactual artifact is of our actual world, rather it is this
very actuality that provokes or catalyzes speculation by
being at the boundary of the actual and the possible. p. 101, MS


EX1: (2018/10/3)
每個同學選讀愛因斯坦的夢一書的其中一個夢。
描述時間在此可能世界中的運作方式。
以可能主義者的實在論 (posssiblist realism) 的觀點,何謂可能主義者? 此者的觀點和立場為何? 其"實在"指的是甚麼?
以真實主義者的再現論(actualist representationism)的觀點,何謂真實主義者? 此者的觀點和立場為何? 其"再現"指的是甚麼?
(上傳至 Google drive, 請見臉書社團)



參考書目:
1. (SE) Speculative Everything
Dunne & Raby, 2013
2.

2018年9月11日 星期二